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a b s t r a c t
The social contract is the deal between the state and its citizens by which the latter agree the rule of the
former in return for deliverables Over time, the state’s deliverables have evolved from simple law and
order to a set of social rights, such as the social contract in North African countries like Egypt,
Morocco and Tunisia –in the 1950s and 1960s. State-led development, including state-led industrial
development, provided jobs to many, with state provision of health and education and a range of consumer subsidies. Deteriorating economic performance led to the collapse of this model as the state could
no longer provide these deliverables. Instead, an ‘unsocial’ social contract emerged under liberalisation in
which the state used trade, industrial and other economic policies to favour an emerging group of crony
capitalists who in turn provided support for the regime. The growing inequality and diminishing benefits
for the masses undermined its sustainability resulting in the Arab Spring. The trajectory of the social contract has differed in the three countries. In Egypt, the ‘unsocial’ social contract is further entrenched. The
army is taking the role of a leading business-group using industrial policy to political ends. Its strong
engagement in the economy makes it an interested party rather than an impartial arbiter. In Morocco,
the King still retains a prime position but has accommodated some pressures for a more inclusive industrial policy in domestic markets, which may lay the basis for a more broadly based social contract. Tunisia
is finding its way to an even more inclusive development model, but is still struggling for consensus for a
clear economic policy direction and remains threatened by extremist elements. International efforts to
support democratic development in these countries need to be conditioned on the differing nature of
the ongoing transitions in the social contract.
Ó 2019 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).

1. Introduction
The Arab countries appeared stable for decades. This stability
disappeared in the eruption of the Arab Spring in 2010. But the
Arab Spring did not come out of nowhere. It was a manifestation
of the rejection of the social contract.
The social contract is the framework for state-society relations
in which citizens recognize the state’s right to govern with certain
obligations placed on the state in return. Analysis of the social contract and the changing engagement of social groups with the state
provides a lens of the forces which have disturbed the equilibrium
of the prevailing social contracts giving way to the emergence of
others.
In Hobbes’ original concept the state primarily provided security and the rule of law. But in modern states the obligations of
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the state have expanded to recognize economic and social rights.
Hence, we define the social contract as a set of explicit and implicit,
formal and informal agreements between the sovereign (i.e. government or other actor in power) and [..] the various social groups that
make up the latter, defining rights and obligations towards each other
(Loewe et al., in this special issue, under review).
This paper analyses three distinct phases of social contracts in
Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia: the populist-authoritarian, the ‘unsocial’ social contract, and the emerging post-Arab Spring contracts.
The focus is on how industrial policy has shaped state-business
relations; these underpin the substantive dimensions of the contract, that is the deliverables exchanged between the state and
each social group. The distribution of these deliverables can create
tensions within a contract.
It is shown that the first contract - the populist authoritarian
social contract - of the 50 s through to the 70 s and the second
‘unsocial’ social contract of the 80 s up to the upheavals were quite
similar for the three countries. The prevailing economic model

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2019.104774
0305-750X/Ó 2019 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).

2

A. El-Haddad / World Development 127 (2020) 104774

shaped the nature of each social contract. The populist contract
was associated with a state-led development model in which the
state produced, managed and distributed goods and services to
its population. It was a period of nation building with many people
supporting their governments thus underpinning a three-decade
long contract.
As the three countries introduced market reforms in the 1970s a
social group of business people emerged forming the basis for a
new ‘unsocial’ social contract. State-business relations were determined by the various degrees of capture of industrial policy. Egypt
occupied one end of the spectrum and Tunisia the other upper end.
Gradually the stability of the contract was shaken. Adam Smith’s
invisible hand of market capitalism provides a way of turning private benefits to the public good. However, in each of the three
countries crony capitalism deformed this mechanism. Crony capitalism represents the most audacious example of Olson’s law
whereby it provides a way of turning public goods to private gain,
padding the pockets of the powerful, undermining economic competitiveness and misdirecting resources (Micklethwait &
Wooldridge, 2015). Block (2018) describes crony capitalism as an
oligarchic market which is the rule by the twenty or fifty or hundred leading families and business groups. In simple terms, it is a
union between capitalists and politicians enabling the former to
acquire wealth and the latter to seek and retain power (Pei,
2016): this is what I call the ‘unsocial’ social contract. Other groups
are marginalized.
Most recently, the three countries have gone in different directions with respect to their social contracts and the state-business
relations within them. These changing relations are central to the
redefinition of the newly emergent social contract. The current
rulers of the three countries have drawn different lessons in their
response to the upheavals leading to substantially differing contracts. The contract is poised to develop into a more inclusive
one in Morocco and Tunisia leading to the potential for a favourable transformation, while in Egypt the ‘unsocial” social contract
has entrenched further.
This paper explores each of these stages in each of the countries.
The analysis is based on the author’s own research on the region as
well as newspaper archives, laws and decrees, and the recent
emerging empirical literature on state-business relations in the
region. Sections 3 and 4 on the ‘unsocial’ social contract and the
period since the upheavals are further informed by eight semi
structured interviews with marginalized business people, selected
union members and officials conducted in the period 2010–2018.
2. Populist-authoritarian social contract for state-led
development
The post-independence populist authoritarian social contract
(see Hinnebusch, 2004) in the three countries was similar in terms
of main actors and deliverables albeit with some differences in
degree.1
Since the 1950s the three countries followed a state-led economic development model (Abdel-Khalek, 2001; Ben Letaïef,
1998; Friedman, 2010; Raballand, Veuillot, Habhab, & de
Meneval, 2015; Radwan, 1997; Waterbury, 1993). The industrial
policy of import substitution industrialization (ISI) during this per1
For example, the public sector was smallest in Morocco and largest in Egypt
(Freyssinet, 2010). In the 60s public investments amounted to about 94% in Egypt and
84% in Tunisia (Signoles, 1985). Morocco developed growing private textiles and
leather industries in the 60s and early 70s but not in large-scale heavy industry
(Clément, 1986). Tunisia’s very small private investment was largest in chemicals
(Bellin, 1991). The same is true in agriculture where the Moroccan government has
not supported small landowners as in Egypt’s or Tunisia’s land reform. Morocco
favoured the rural elite (Houdret, Zakaria, & Bossenbroeck, 2017) which constituted a
powerful ally to the King and his entourage in the next social contract.

iod constituted an integral part of the social contract. In all three
countries, ISI protected national industries through (prohibitive)
import tariffs, quotas and outright import bans. These protections
benefited the managers and employees of the large state owned
enterprise (SOE) sector and the entrepreneurs in the very small private sector in Morocco, which constituted just 5% of all production
(Clément, 1986; see footnote 1). The state was the sole economic
planner and the main producer which allowed it to achieve sufficient control over the economy to manage employment in both
the large industrial (SOE) sector and the bureaucracy (El-Haddad,
2010; Saulniers, 2003). State-business relations were more or less
confined to the public sector.
The dominant underlying narrative was independence from the
west with the aspiration to establish national dignity through selfsufficiency. It was a period of nation building, most notably under
Nasser with his vision of pan-Arab nationalism. Many people were
genuinely committed to forging independent Arab states and supported their governments accordingly.
SOE revenues, oil and phosphate revenues, worker remittances,
Suez Canal revenues and foreign aid ensured the state’s provision
of additional deliverables as part of the social contract as well as
citizen protection and employment opportunities. These were services to the middle classes such as free university education,
cheap, high quality social services (e.g. health) and consumer subsidies for the masses (e.g. for clothes, food, electricity, water and
fuel). It was a populist social contract that included public-sector
workers, civil servants and military elites, which is the reason
why in this section the entire economy is lumped under one sector
in contrast to the ‘unsocial’ social contract which is discussed
below.
Workers were co-opted through official unions. The Moroccan
Workers’ Union (UMT) and the General Union of Moroccan Workers (UGTM) were not independent. UMT leaders held government
positions, its offices, wage and utility bills were all financed by government. UGTM was even less independent (Entelis, 1996). In
Egypt and Tunisia unions were part of the ‘socialist establishment’.
Tunisia’s General Trade Union (UGTT) was a major support to Bourguiba in nationalizing key sectors, and the same was the case in
Egypt.
The legitimacy of the state was thus secured through a populist
approach in which the middle class was provided high quality public services, consumer subsidies and employment under the larger
narrative of integrity and the sense of nationalism that the people
longed for. This legitimacy was mirrored in citizen loyalty in the
form of citizen acquiescence to the lack of political participation
(Fig. 1) -and subsequently, in the 70 s and 80 s – of a flawed rule
of law.
The two oil crises in the 70 s, growing populations, deteriorating performance of the state-led development model and mounting western pressure resulted in a wave of liberalisation policies
which started a crack in the social contract. Liberalisation meant
that jobs were no longer entirely within the purview of government. Reduced government resources resulted in deteriorating
public services and reduced consumer subsidies. The people
became restless manifested in part by an increasing number of
strikes. The newly established socialist democratic workers confederation (CDT) was involved in the labour unrest of 1978 and
1979 in Casablanca. In 1981 it held a general strike call to protest
reductions in food subsidies. Union leaders were arrested. There
were also popular protests, starting with Egypt’s bread riots in
1977, and followed by Tunisia’s and Morocco’s ‘bloody bread riots’
of 1983 and 1984 respectively. These protests were spontaneous
carried out by the masses with no sign of the unions’ involvement
(Entelis, 1996). A number of people were killed and injured and the
protests ceased with the deployment of the army. The state was no
longer honoring its side of the bargain, and so began to reshape the
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Fig. 1. The populist-authoritarian Social Contract of the 50 s and 60 s. Source:
Author’s design.

social contract to one in which its support base was rooted in the
elite rather than the masses.
3. The ‘unsocial’ social contract’ 1980–2010
The economic reforms put in place to address the crisis of the
old development model accelerated the end of the old populist
social contract. As the rents which funded this model dried up a
power struggle ensued with crony capitalists capturing the
remaining and emerging rents rather than the middle classes, creating an ‘unsocial’ social contract. The term unsocial here alludes to
the fact that a growing number of societal groups were being
excluded from negotiating or benefitting from the contract, ultimately leading to the upheavals in 2010–11.
Industrial policy (IP)2 played an important role in shaping an
asymmetric power structure. The main IP strategies prior to the
uprisings were Egypt’s Industrial Development Strategy (EIDS)
launched in 2006, Morocco’s National Pact for Industrial Emergence
(PNEI) starting in 2005 and Tunisia’s National Upgrading Programme
(PMN) starting in 1995 updated in 2006. These programmes were
intended to provide firms with technical assistance, training, market
information, subsidies, credit and infrastructure upgrades to enable
them to survive in the face of fierce international competition in
an open-market economy. IP was broad and included governments’
selective use of measures to affect structural change and the business environment through regulatory and economic policies. Until
the period preceding the uprisings, all three countries had witnessed
improvements in exports and some favourable structural transformation towards industry away from primary sectors (Fig. A21,
Achy, 2015; El-Haddad, 2015a; Loewe, 2013).
Tunisia’s program has been hailed as a success story by the
international community and a role model for other MENA and
African countries given the substantial and sustainable rise in
exports, stable growth and growing industrial production
(Altenburg, 2011; Erdle, 2011; Murphy, 2006). Tunisia followed a
dual model whereby the export-oriented offshore sector is open
to free competition and distinctly represented its competitive side
of the economy (cf. Achy, 2012). Compared to Egypt and Morocco it
has indeed been the most successful.3 Despite similar GDP per capita growth rates (Fig. A1) between 2001 and 2007, 4Tunisia witnessed superior structural transformation as shown by indicators
of trade openness (Fig. A21a) non-oil manufacturing value added5
2
IPs mandate is to correct market failures to achieve goals such as industrial
upgrading, export promotion, sophistication and diversification, i.e. structural
transformation through the governments’ selective interventions (cf. Pack & Saggi,
2007).
3
Being a small, resource-poor country, Tunisia had to largely rely on its better
functioning, more productive side of the economy with a coherent export strategy to
absorb the growing workforce.
4
Interrupted in 2008 by the financial crisis.
5
Value added is any activities’ output value minus the value of intermediate inputs
used for its production.

3

(Fig. A21b), non-oil exports (Fig. A21c) during the period just preceding the uprisings, 2004–2010. More generally, Tunisia’s VA to GDP
was more than triple that of Egypt and double that of Morocco during that period (calculated from UNIDO, 2018). Egypt on the other
hand, is consistently the worst of the three countries. Egypt’s structural transformation is limited with manufacturing strongly dominated by hydrocarbons at close to 17% of manufacturing VA
compared to just 2.5% for Tunisia (Fig. A5i).
Yet this success is irrelevant to the three countries’ social contract transition story for two reasons. First, IP was captured favouring the cronies over other private sector firms. Second, the informal
sector and potential labour market entrants were excluded from its
benefits. Successful firm and job creation is key to contract and
regime stability, legitimacy and durability. But in each of the three
countries the major instrument of privilege are barriers to entry
into market segments allowing cronies the accumulation of substantial rents (cf. Chekir & Diwan, 2015; Arouri, Baghdadi, &
Rijkers, 2019; Henry & Springborg, 2010; Heydemann, 2004;
King, 2009; Malik & Eibl, 2019; Owen, 2004; Rijkers, Arouri, &
Baghdadi, 2017, b; Rijkers, Baghdadi, & Raballand, 2017; Rijkers,
Freund, & Nucifora, 2017; Schiffbauer, Sy, Hussain, Sahnoun, &
Keefer, 2014; Atiyas, Galal, & Selim, 2015; Rijkers et al., 2013;
World Bank, 2014). These barriers to entry limited competition
thereby increasing the cronies’ profits.6 Banks compete to lend
them as they have become low risk compared to their nonconnected counterparts, in turn perpetuating their advantaged position. Given their secured market shares: 1) cronies have no incentive
to innovate and non-cronies cannot benefit from doing so in the face
of competitors with artificially low costs and; 2) they also rarely exit
their markets. Potential entrants thus never enter. This results in the
‘missing middle’ phenomenon, where the distribution of firms with a
concentration of very old mostly large firms on the one hand and of
large numbers of very small firms on the other (Census Data). Since
innovative young firms are those that create jobs (Haltiwanger,
Jarmin, & Miranda, 2010, for MENA see Diwan, Keefer, &
Schiffbauer, 2014; Rijkers, Freund, & Nucifora, 2014), the patterns
of protection have blocked entry, limited job creation resulting in
unemployment7 and sustained growth in informality (Cammett &
Diwan, 2016).
Egypt’s presidents had the backing of the army to stabilize the
system, Morocco on the other hand has the King and the Royal
house who rely much on their ‘religious soft power’. These autocratic leaders believed legitimacy can be ensured with little broad
societal agreement on deliverables and with more exclusionary
widespread use of industrial policy as an instrument of patronage
in return for political favour. As a result, cronies are more widespread in Egypt and Morocco than in Tunisia. In all three, they
dominate major services sectors but in contrast to Tunisia they also
have a large presence in manufacturing in Egypt and Morocco.8
The three countries used thus select coalitions to embed the
reforms implemented through IP in support of Evans’ ‘‘insular
embeddedness” as opposed to his concept of ‘‘embedded autonomy” (Evans, 1995) - a concept which is useful in assessing the nature of the social contract. Evans argues that state effectiveness
arises from the nature and quality of its relation with groups in
society (Evans, 1995). The state is not insulated from society, as

6
In Egypt politically connected firms accounted for only 11 percent of total
employment, but 60 percent of total net profits. In Tunisia the Ben Ali’s confiscated
firms captured 21 percent of all net private sector profits in 2010 but created only 3%
of output (World Bank, 2014).
7
There is a wider range of other economic factors that also cause unemployment
but they are the topic of a different paper.
8
In Egypt, they operate in nearly half of manufacturing (Schiffbauer et al., 2014).
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in Weber’s ideal type. Rather the state is ‘‘embedded in a concrete set
of social ties that binds the state to society and provides institutionalized channels for [the negotiation] of goals and policies” (Evans,
1995:12). A fully autonomous state would lack the information
and ability to rely on decentralized private implementation. The
state’s engagement in dense social networks without a robust
internal structure would leave the state prone to capture. It is ‘‘only
when embeddedness and autonomy are joined together can a state be
called developmental.” (Evans, 1995:12). Autonomy however must
rest on legitimacy, which needs rest on a broad enough social base
to be sustainable. Rulers need to ally with different social classes,
which is the nature of embeddedness.
The mutual exchanges between the state and five main socioeconomic groups allowed the ‘unsocial’ social contract to survive
for over three decades before it eventually broke down. I describe
below how this contract operated, and eventually collapsed, in
each of the three countries.

3.1. The most favoured social group
The cronies are the regime’s clientele, owners and managers of
businesses benefitting from preferential treatment by the regime.
In return, they provide political support.9
Crony capitalism was central to Egypt’s transition to the ‘unsocial’ social contract. Prominent business people became politicians
and vice versa. They were politically connected to the government
with direct access to policy formation as ministers, National Democratic Party (NDP) members, and through their influential presence
on boards and committees of essential economic institutions
(Osman, 2010; Youm7, 2012) such as the Economic Policies Committee (EPC), which was chaired by President Mubarak’s son Gamal
Mubarak. The EPC guided the liberalization process from privatization to financial sector and trade reforms including IP. These institutional structures allowed the president’s son and his clientele of
businesspeople to successfully capture the opportunities provided
by the economy’s liberalization process and much of the incentives
from IP (Cammett, Richards, & Waterbury, 2015; Chekir & Diwan,
2015; Times, 2011). Thus enabling them to further direct the deliverables of the contract to their favour, increasingly excluding major
social groups from the economic sphere.
The government shielded connected firms from competition by
granting preferential access in subsidies, public procurement and
privatization, and providing exclusive operating licenses to distribute international brands. Such access was granted for the
high-energy subsidy, in large-scale housing projects, construction,
real estate, transport, hotels and restaurants at coastal areas (tourism sector), the oil and gas sectors, in directed bank credit and
large prime land acquisitions from the government, involving
closed and nontransparent deals, such as the Madinaty city project
acquired by Talaat Mustapha (Almasryalyoum, 2010). Tourist
resorts and factories in specific manufacturing sectors such as
cement were built on formerly government-owned land
(Almasryalyoum, 2017). In the automotive sector, the transport
minister Mansour had exclusive import licenses for Chevorelet
and Opel, and the Ghabour family had the same for Hyundai (ElHaddad, Hodge, & Manek, 2017, for capture in Telecommunication
see El-Haddad, 2015b, 2017).
In the steel market Ahmed Ezz, a prominent EPC member,
unlawfully acquired 28% of the shares of the government controlled Alexandria National Iron and Steel Company in 1999, consolidating the two companies under the name Ezz-Dekhela Steel
(EZDK) which controlled 62% of the domestic market. Moreover,
9
For Egypt in particular the army has been– in functional terms - a sub-group of
this group as will be presented later.

the government imposed barriers to entry for other vertically integrated structures into the industry through outright rejection of
licenses and large import tariffs (20%) to protect the company,
turning it into the only vertically integrated steel company in the
country and reinforcing its dominant position.10 This company,
and the majority of companies in capital-intensive sectors, were also
protected through the massive energy subsidy made available to just
a handful of businessmen who thus generated enormous profits
from these exclusive benefits.
Together with the steel industry, cement forms the backbone of
the Egyptian construction and real estate market. High potential
profits have attracted multinational entry, but entry had been
restricted to protect the few national and army-owned companies
from competition, in particular Sinai Cement currently known as
Arish-Sinai Plant in which the majority shareholder is Egypt’s
Department of Defense.11 Media announced reason for license rejection is that the potential entrants are energy intensive highly polluting firms.12 Nevertheless, fierce competition amongst the
multinationals in the market has slashed prices, virtually driving
higher cost national companies out of the market (El-Haddad,
2015a). In response, the minister of the public enterprise sector
sealed a deal with all companies to fix prices at a level above the free
market price to divide the market between the existing companies
explicitly blocking competition.
In Egypt, unlike in Tunisia, the transition to a market economy
was not preceded by the necessary regulatory framework. Liberalization preceded the enactment of a competition law and the
establishment of a competition authority which took place more
than a decade later in 2005.13,14
The decision to grant operating licenses was not left to an
autonomous bureaucracy and a system of checks and balances.
Rather, the laws themselves ensured discretionary treatment in
favour of preferred firms. The General Authority for Investment
and Free Zones, responsible for implementing investment law
no.8 1997, had the discretion to expedite approval or keep files
pending. The same law also granted the Cabinet the right to allocate free land for investment projects and various tax exemptions.
The situation worsened in the following decades; laws such as law
no. 13 for 2004 and presidential decree 30 for 2005 gave just one
person, the prime minister, substantial discretion in granting
licenses. Policy capture is when regulatory goals are altered to
serve political ends and it was clearly the case. The way in which
regulation was enacted is consistent with public choice theory
(Acemoglu & Verdier, 2000; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993, 1994)
which argues that regulation chiefly serves the interests of those
who create it or maybe captured by those who stand to benefit
from it (Stigler, 1971). The laws became an instrument for favoritism toward just a handful of businessmen allowing a new class of
ultra-rich to emerge.
In Morocco, the cronies are connected to the royal family in a
number of ways. First, the diversified business groups of holding
companies with strong connections to the royal court (called
mekhzen) effect their influence through their roles as foundations

10
In the wake of the revolution in 2011 Ezz has been found guilty with unlawful
acquisition of shares, tax evasion, money laundering and embezzlement of public
funds. The minister of investment and five of EZDK officials were found guilty of
giving out the operating license to Ezz for free and without a public tender (Selim,
2006, El-Haddad, 2015a).
11
In 2008 it controlled a market share of six percent (El-Haddad, 2015a).
12
as if the existing ones aren’t!
13
Tunisia has had a competition law since 1991, Morocco only since 2000 though
not as late as Egypt.
14
Only in 2008, after the Egyptian competition law was enacted and the market
investigated by the Egyptian Competition Authority, did the courts find producers
guilty of collusion for the 20 months from 2005 (May) 2006 (December), i.e. the
period immediately following enactment of the law (ECA, 2008 in El-Haddad, 2015a).
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board members, royal advisors and close friends to the King (Malik
& Eibl, 2019). Second, politicians – notably cabinet ministers who
have large stakes in the private sector. More than 370 firms are
owned by holding companies in which the King himself has a stake
(Malik & Eibl, 2019; Willis, 2002; Saadi, 2016). Generally, members
of the royal foundations have a common board or family member
that owns a bank or a financial institution to ensure the flow of
credit (Oubenal & Ben Hamouda, 2018).
Businessmen had substantial influence on policies as the number of businesspeople increased in parliament and a number of
Moroccan entrepreneurs became ministers since 1997 (BennaniChraïbi, 2008). This is in contrast to Ben Ali in Tunisia, who brought
technocrats into leading positions. Ben Ali blocked any attempts
for entrepreneurs to gain autonomy through sanctions and tax
controls but also shaming (case of Kamel Eltaief) and firing (case
of Mansour Moalla from BIAT Bank) (Oubenal & Ben Hamouda,
2018). This however did not prevent the clan’s private business
interests to dictate policy.
Eibl and Malik (2018) show that the cronies in both Morocco
and Egypt have disproportionately received higher levels of nontariff protection (an IP measure) after tariffs were phased out in
accordance with the two countries’ EU-Mediterranean association
agreements. Dominant NTMs were technical barriers to trade and
pre-shipment inspections, measures that rely on administrative
oversight and are prone to selective enforcement (ibid., Diwan &
Haidar, 2016). Firm level data also showed systematic variation
in regulation enforcement, allowing connected firms to disproportionately benefit from the enforcement of rules. For example, nonpolitically connected firms were more frequently targeted by government inspections15 and sectors with politically connected firms
are subject to higher rates of inspection16 compared to their nonconnected counterparts (Diwan, Keefer, & Schiffbauer, 2016).
In Tunisia over 50 percent of the economy is subject to full or
partial entry restrictions, equivalent to a tax on revenue of 13 percent (Rijkers et al., 2014; World Bank, 2014). These restrictions
take a number of forms such as the number of firms allowed in
the market in specific sectors (e.g. road transport, railways, fisheries, tourism (travel agencies), advertising, health, specific sectors,
real estate, agricultural extension services, vocational and professional training, telecoms, education). There are also legal monopolies mostly but not exclusively in utilities (tobacco supply chain,
water, gas, electricity, road transport, air transport). Laws such as
the Investment Incentive Code (Law No. 93-120, 1993 amended
in 2009), the Commerce Code and even the Competition Law often
reinforce these barriers. These regulations can also take the form of
a sectoral legislation particularly in services (ibid.).
The laws bolstered Tunisia’s dual system in a manner that has
created opportunities for rents for the onshore sector. The investment law grants the offshore export-oriented sector investment
incentives.17 But the same law has subjected the onshore sector,
where the majority of Ben Ali’s and Tarabelsi18 businesses operate,
to various entry restrictions. ‘Offshore’ firms cannot easily compete
in domestic ‘onshore’ markets. Around 40 percent of the sectors with
at least one Ben Ali firm require previous authorization from the
Investment Commission (Schiffbauer et al., 2014) suggesting regulatory capture where the regulator favors particular firms (cf. Rijkers,
2013). In 2011, the estimated total value of clan-confiscated assets
amount to a quarter of Tunisia’s GDP. There are also cases of outright
closures of businesses that directly compete with those of Ben Ali’s
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such as the Bouebdelli School, and the restriction on the entry of
McDonalds (Rijkers et al., 2014). Compared to comparator countries,
Tunisia maintained monopolies even in segments of transport and
telecom that have been for long identified as normally subject to
competition (World Bank, 2014).
As a result, the protected firms have accumulated substantial
profits that in turn led the state-dominated banking system to
favour them with loans. They have received close to 2.5 percent
of GDP in bank loans, around a third of which were granted without guarantee (ibid.).
Constraints to competition limited private sector growth and
job creation in the onshore sector and damaged the competitiveness of the offshore sector19 thus limiting Tunisia’s counterfactual
growth (of manufacturing) and high value added job creation.
Industrial policy has thus been captured by cronies. What did
the cronies deliver in return?
3.2. Cronies’ deliverables to the regime
Elections in these patrimonial autocratic regimes were a means
of conferring legitimacy on the regime who distributes the benefits
from rent seeking to key supporters (Blaydes, 2011). Cronies
played a large role in provision of political support in each of the
three countries (Fig. 2). In Egypt, in return for government favours,
businesspeople, often literally, bought votes to keep government in
power in the pseudo-democracy. During the 2010 elections,
Ahmed Ezz and other prominent businesspeople hired thugs to
intimidate ordinary people and stop them voting (interview #1
2011, including own experience). Ezz bussed thousands of employees of his steel factory (EZDK) and arranged for the bussing of government employees from other state and semi-state enterprises
and ministries to vote for the regime. In Morocco, politically connected firms are more likely to give implicit orders for their
employees to vote for the main party (Kubinec, 2018). Even in rural
areas, local elites and large landowners cooperate with the Caid
(intelligence body) and the police to keep the rural population
depoliticised so that it doesn’t present a threat to the monarchy
(Bergh & Rossi-Doria, 2015; Bergh, 2008). In Tunisia the National
Council of the Tunisian Union of Industry, Trade and Handicrafts,
in short the employers’ association UTICA closely supported the
president in elections, issuing a statement in 2010 calling on him
to run for the following elections in 2014 (Sadiki, 2010).
3.3. The growth of disadvantaged social groups
In the three countries public sector employees are the second
most privileged group enjoying lifetime job security, social protection, annual public sector wage raises, and a number of allowances
and various - if decreasing - consumer subsidies and social services. In 2007 in Tunisia the average government salary was 67%
above the national average (Mahjoub, 2010) and in Morocco and
Egypt those wages were more than twice those of the private sector (World Bank, 2011; Malouche, Reyes, & Fouad, 2013; Assaad,
Krafft, Roemer, & Salehi-Isfahani, 2016, Assaad and Krafft,
2015).20 The public sector job with its convenient and relatively
short hours allowed for moonlighting mostly in the growing informal sector (World Bank, 2011). With weak controls, it also provided
opportunities for bureaucratic rent-seeking and increased absenteeism (World Bank, 2016). Further privileged within this group
are the judiciary, auditors, internal security forces and the military

15

Tax inspections, municipality inspections, labour inspections.
24 percent higher.
17
In an assessment, these industrial policy tools have been deemed ineffective as
almost 80% of the investment would have taken place in the absence of these
incentives (World Bank, 2014).
18
Ben Ali’s wife’s family.
16

19
For example, in Tunisia the price of international telephone calls was 10 to 20
times the international market price, the price of air tickets is estimated at 30 to 50
percent higher than elsewhere and so on (World Bank, 2014).
20
In Egypt the premium is positive for women but negative for men (Tansel et al.,
2018).
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Fig. 2. The ‘Unsocial’ Social Contract Chart. Source: Author’s Design. Note: The basic deliverables of security and protection are omitted from this chart for simplicity.

and customs employees who have better remuneration (ibid.).
Despite a smaller relative public sector, Morocco with its generous
salaries had a wage bill above the MENA average and as a percent
of GDP almost equal to that of Tunisia (12.3% of GDP in 2006). In
return, government employees paid the wage tax and provided the
regime with loyalty (Fig. 2).21
Of all employed, informal sector participants are the least privileged. Following the rapid growth of the sector since the 1970s it
is currently estimated that over 60 percent of the total labour force
of Egypt and Morocco occupies the informal economy, with Tunisia
slightly less at 53 percent (Abdelhamid & El Mahdi, 2003;
Boughzala & Kouki, 2003; El-Mahdi & Rashed, 2007; ILO, 2018).
The poor cannot afford to be unemployed and so join the ranks
of the informal economy working in low productivity jobs.
The relationship between the informal sector and the state in
the three countries can be portrayed as what Tendler (2002) calls
‘‘The Devil’s Deal” in which some informal sector generated benefits allow for the toleration of informal economic activities (Gallien,
2018). The sector creates jobs for the masses that are excluded
from either the small captured, private sector or the large public
sector. It thus helps stabilize the regime in an implicit deal
between the two which is guaranteed by the inability of workers
of the sector to form unions and associations to protest their economic or political grievances.
The unprivileged formal labor market participants and the unemployed, i.e. the potential entrants to the labor market form the third
and fourth main aggrieved social groups of the contract. Politically
unconnected employers and employees of the crony-dominated
private sectors just scrape by. They have to pay taxes and work
long hours, but often receive scant services in return. They do
not have access to the benefits enjoyed by either the cronies or
those in the public sector.
The unemployed are worse off. Middle class youth who would
have gone into government jobs under the old social contract do
become unemployed (Assaad, 2009). They are also unable to join
the largely undynamic, scantly job-creating crony dominated pri-

21
This is with the exception of some largely ineffective public sector labour strikes
in relation to privatization in all three countries. The role of the labour unions will be
addressed later in the paper.

vate sector. Together with informal sector participants, they are
not just excluded from industrial policy but from institutions such
as health, financial services, the judiciary and social security (cf.
Gallien, 2018). Unable to save and so unable to get married produces a large group of frustrated males. Women are more constrained. The long hours and often remote opportunities of the
private sector make it less of an option (Assaad & Arntz, 2005;
Assaad and Boughzala, 2018). In the prevailing social contract, this
group gives and receives nothing to and from the regime (Fig. 2).
3.4. Demise of the ‘Unsocial’ social contract
With the market-oriented, neo-liberal reforms the three governments placed cuts on public sector hiring in the 1990s and
freezes as of the 2000s. Starting in the mid-90s Morocco followed
a restrictive employment strategy, placing a freeze on public
wages, and introducing early retirement as of 2004 (World Bank,
2011). Tunisia began to privatize in the late 80s, Egypt and Morocco in the 90s. These policies resulted in reductions in public sector employment (World Bank, 2015). Morocco’s public sector wage
bill declined from 12.3% of GDP in 2006 to just 10.2% in 2010 as a
result (World Bank, 2011).
Employment lost in the sector could not be absorbed by the
captured private sector, so retrenched workers either join the
ranks of the informal sector or become unemployed.22 Thus, the
benefits they fully received under the populist contract were gradually and substantially bowdlerized.
In 2008, the Moroccan Democratic Federation of Labor (FDT)
called for a national strike across the public sector for higher wages
(World Bank, 2011). Former public sector employees directly suffered from privatization. In Egypt, workers of Ghazl El-Mahala
and Misr Company for Spinning and Weaving called for strikes,
reaching 24,000 workers in April 2008. These strikes were put
down with substantial repression (Abdalla, 2012). Despite increasing control of the Ben Ali regime of the Tunisian General Trade
Union (UGTT, King, 2009), it emerged as a key instigator of antigovernment unrest organizing protests in the mining region of
22
In Egypt, the formal private sector absorbed just 4% of the 16% drop in the
employment share of the public sector (El-Haddad & Gadallah, 2018).
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Gafsa in 2008 and 2010 that were the nearest precursor to the
December 2010 uprising (Arieff, 2011).
The growing labour unrest compounded that of the potential
labor market participants, i.e. the unemployed and their informal
sector counterparts both of whom are excluded from formality.
The informal sector has been increasingly marginalised. Egypt’s
private sector development strategy in 2006 for example explicitly
excluded small and micro enterprises with less than 50 employees
(Loewe, 2013). A small program devoted to micro and small enterprise (MSE) promotion was left to the Social Fund for Development (SFD) which suffered from plenty inefficiency and
corruption (ibid.). In Tunisia, in addition to highlighting the discretion and bureaucratic secretiveness obstructing scrutiny of IP, a
World Bank Country report warned of growing poverty in areas
that IP doesn’t reach and growing unemployment and vulnerability of what used to be the large middle classes (Murphy, 2006). But
the next wave of Tunisian PMN had an even narrower reach (ibid.).
Likewise, Morocco’s PNEI had relatively very limited funds
devoted to MSEs, and banks avoided lending small firms
(L’economiste, 2011).
Additionally, informal jobs are mainly low-skill, low-pay, concentrated in sectors such as agriculture, construction, street vending and low value added services especially of rural migrants
(Moktar and Wahba, 2002; El-Haddad, 2015a; Assaad, Krafft, &
Yassin, 2018). Informal jobs carry thus a wage penalty. They are
unstable, limit human capital development opportunities and thus
wage progression creating an inertia known as the ‘‘informality
trap”. The sector almost solely absorbed the departing middle
classes of the public sector.23 Evidence from Egypt shows that this
unregulated sector responded dramatically to these competitive
pressures by supressing the lowest wages even further, thus resulting in sharp wage gaps between the highest and lowest wage earners, hence increased wage inequality (El-Haddad & Gadallah,
2018).24
As legitimacy was eroded, governance of the informal sector
was increasingly left to the security apparatus. The sector was a
target for harassment and demands for petty corruption by the
authorities, with periodic attempts to close down informal operations. This approach allowed the police to generate additional illicit
income from informal businesses. These rents were tolerated by
the regime in exchange for political favor in elections and in
informing on and suppressing potential activists that opposed
the regime. The security force is a mafia that extracts rents from
street vendors, street valets and illegal tok tok drivers amongst
others (interview #2 2016, Youm7, 2010 for Egypt, Ennahar,
2014 for Tunisia). The police and other security bodies25 were
bought with their sets of deliverables to keep the citizens in check
and prevent them from organizing in any form either as independent
informal labor unions, as political NGOs, or as real instead of pseudopolitical parties.
The ‘unsocial’ social contract failed to deliver the earlier generous deliverables of the populist social contract, gradually excluding
more and more social groups, thus testing the tolerance of the
masses. The legitimacy of the state was worn by weak economic
opportunities, increasing inequality and blatant favouritism. The
marginalized groups realized that the existing social contract is
‘unsocial’, being merely a deal between the autocratic governments
and crony businessmen who benefit from protection, access to
government contracts and suppression of organized labour. The

23
On the patterns of sectoral labour movements over time (see Assaad & Krafft,
2013).
24
For more general evidence that persistent informality leads to greater inequality
see Jutting and de Laiglesia (2009).
25
The detailed description of these groups are the subject matter of future research
and is excluded from the focus of this paper.
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masses are excluded from shaping any part of this contract, being
kept in check by increasingly empty promises of social programmes and (police) repression. Their comprehension of their
meagre value in the contract created a butterfly effect that steadily
built opposition to the ‘unsocial’ social contract creating a critical
mass that eventually sparked the Arab Spring.
In the few years leading up to the revolution informal economy
participants protested their forced exclusion from the formal economy - blocked by the few protected, powerful cronies - and against
the extortion and repression of the security apparatus. In December 2010, Mohamed Bouazizi, an informal vendor in Tunisia set
himself on fire after a confrontation with a police officer, becoming
a uniting force and symbol of the Tunisian revolution and the 2011
uprisings against regime brutality and inability to deliver. Since the
regime did not honour its side of the post-populist bargain the
masses stopped accepting the regime’s right to rule.
Just two weeks prior to the death of Bouazizi the masses encouraged by what’s left of the young middle classes - instigated
the first flame of the Arab Spring. Egypt followed. In Morocco the
February 20 movement (F20M) peaked in April with 110 demonstrations and around 900,000 participants who were driven by
their economic grievances of inequality of opportunity and the
underlying political underpinnings of lack of transparency,
accountability and their own inability to politically participate.
The F20M demanded a guaranteed rule of law through the separation of powers, free and independent legal system, freedom of
expression and the right of employment and fair wages. Some of
the movement participants denounced the king and his royal
entourage (the mekhzen and the politicians), labeling them as
‘mafia’ and ‘predators’ (Bergh & Rossi-Doria, 2015).
In Egypt and Tunisia the ‘unsocial’ social contract appeared to
have ended. Morocco was saved the same fate given a chance to
renegotiate its still existing contract.

4. The newly emerging social contracts: lessons learned
The rulers of the three countries drew different lessons in their
response to the social upheavals, so the newly emerging social contract differs substantially between the three countries. In Morocco
and Tunisia there exist potential for a favourable transformation. In
Egypt, however, the ‘unsocial’ social contract’s position has become
deeply entrenched with limited prospects for a positive transformation. Governments in the three countries have realized the
threats the marginalized social groups can pose to their legitimacy
resulting in changes in both the crony structure and some of the
dialogue processes. Moreover, all three have included explicit elements of MSME development and employment policies in their
recent IPs.
Egypt’s cronies have largely been replaced or co-opted by the
army. The army’s role in the reconfiguration of Egypt’s emerging
social contract is fundamental. It has been a central actor in the
Egyptian political landscape since the Free Officers took power in
1952. From that date, army officers were placed in senior government positions at both national and governorate level. The army
had control of large areas of land and a range of economic activities. The army leadership’s decision not to fire on protestors in January 2011 both ended the rule of Mubarak and put the army in the
role of protector of the people. The army did not expect to see any
diminution of its role and soon stepped in to take power when the
democratically elected Muslim Brotherhood government sought to
actively take the reins of government. Although the army retains
power, a series of elections showed a divided country with close
to a 50:50 split between the Army faction and the Islamists. The
government’s response to this situation, with memories of
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Mubarak’s downfall, has been to reinstate the ‘unsocial’ social contract but with increased repression.
El Sisi has reconstructed the previous former network of privileges. His ideology is to expand the role of the military in energy
and construction with the aid of three allies: 1) Gulf donors
(UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait) who hold stakes in army projects
and expect Egypt’s help in fighting the Muslim Brotherhood
amongst other things; 2) the military itself by appointing generals
at virtually all levels of government and; 3) a select set of the business elite who benefit from sub-contracts with the military. Those
elites possess indispensable extensive domestic and international
networks and direct control of the media and hence cannot be
excluded (cf. Roll, 2014). Hassan Rateb, chairman of armydominated Sinai Cement, is also chairman of Mehwer, a proregime TV network. Likewise, Sada El Balad and others are now
main propaganda networks for the regime.
The army operates on an even less level playing field than that
enjoyed by Mubarak’s cronies. The military budget has been
always secret, its industries unaudited and untaxed and its profits
are ‘‘off budget”. But now more explicit tools for extracting rents
have emerged. The new constitution grants the president much
stronger executive power and gives the armed forces an extraconstitutional status (The Constitution of Egypt, 2014). Military
facilities and infrastructure are subject to military jurisdiction, a
definition that has been largely expanded, de facto giving the army
direct control of vast areas of land. It retains the opacity of its budget, since it can only be presented to parliament as a total sum with
no details provided (ibid.). In November 2014, President Sisi
decreed that in cases of ‘‘emergency”, government ministries could
skip a bidding process and instead award development contracts to
the company of their choosing (Hauslohner, 2014). In 2014, the
Minister of Finance amended the Customs Exemptions Law
(#861, 2005) to exempt the Ministries of Defense and of Military
Production from Custom Duties (Almasryalyoum, 2014). They also
have privileged access to raw materials, in the words of one
respondent ‘‘the army first, then the private sector can take the leftovers” (interview #3 2017). These exemptions are on top of the
use of conscripted labour. All privileges significantly increase the
army’s cost advantage so that even in fair bids the army would
win.26
Former discretionary elements in regulation persist, reinforced
by the investment law of 2017 which includes a so-called ‘golden
licence’ allowing the prime minister to issue a single approval
encompassing all required business operating licences as well as
land allocation and building permits for strategic and national projects. In South Korea the domestic market was used as a reward for
excellent export performance (Amsden, 1989; El-Haddad, 2010;
Wade, 1990) or to protect an infant industry. Neither of these arguments seem to apply in the case of Egypt. Privilege is granted without any announced specified developmental goals other than
expanding the army’s political position in the country. The rhetoric
is nationalistic: restoration of Egyptian dignity by reducing the
country’s dependence on imports and the west in general, and
rebuilding Egypt. Moreover, the army is Egypt’s saviour from terrorism, what Rutherford (2018) calls a protection pact, which suggests the social contract for the majority is stripped back down to
the basic Hobbesian one of providing law and order. However,
some distribution from the army to the public takes place in the
form of grants, as if recipients were receiving a favour rather than
services financed from taxation.
The Military’s power is evident in the expansion of its nonmilitary production – from manufacture of basic items such as bot-

26
As an example from close to home, army contracts were the safest, fastest and
cheapest building the annex of my own faculty in the University.

tled water and furniture into mega-infrastructure, energy and
technology projects.27 It is crowding out private production. During
2016 pharmaceutical operation licenses were rejected, but in
November of that year a license was granted to the armed forces
(Alyoum, 2018, interview #3 2017). Army-owned supermarkets
have been opened across the country, allegedly to serve the masses.
The Ministry of Military Production, in cooperation with the Ministries of Petroleum and Electricity, established a company to maintain state-owned power stations. The army holds stakes in oil and
gas (as well as an explicit veto right). In 2013, the Arab Organization
for Industrialization, a body of the military, founded a company for
wind and solar power (Noll, 2017). Since taking power, the Armed
Forces Engineering Authority has completed hundreds of public projects amounting to several billions of Egyptian pounds from roads to
bridges, social housing, hospitals, tunnels. . .etc. (ibid.). Noncooperation with the Egyptian Competition Authority to investigate
cases of predation or abuse of dominance in markets has been
reported (interview #4 2017).
Embeddedness of the state is again insular, exclusive to the network of privilege and is exercised in non-autonomous ‘predatory’
ways; see Evans (1995) concept of the predatory state. The link
between support for the government and success in business has
become if anything more blatant with asset confiscation from companies whose owners are seen to favour the opposition or present a
threat to the regime (Arabiya, 2017; Youm7, 2018).28 29Another
striking example, were pressures on the Competition Authority
(ECA) to file a case of abuse of dominance against Ipsos the global
market research firm (interview #5 2018). Ispos’ market ranking of
Egyptian television did not favour the regime’s channels (ibid.).
ECA rejected as no grounds were seen for the case and its managing
director stepped down as a result. But the regime found another
way: the Manpower Ministry ordered the closure of the company,
citing workplace health and safety violations through a ministerial
decree on June 20 (Reuters, 2017). In general, the regime tries to control the content of all publishing in the country through explicit
threats and sometimes direct control as in the case of Alef bookstores (interview #6 2018).
At the same time, business benefits from the increasingly
repressive environment with the clamp down on independent
unions. Sisi perceives that the moves of the National Democratic
Party to political openness paved the way for Murbarak’s downfall,
and so is clamping down on opposition, dissenting voices and open
debate even pertaining to mundane economics issues. The 2013
anti-protest law 107/2013 requires secret service approval for
strikes, thus effectively eliminating citizens’ rights of peaceful
assembly and demonstration. Both Islamic and civil activists have
been imprisoned in their thousands (Amnesty, 2018; Watch, 2018).
Official IP efforts are insufficient. The design of Egypt’s new
Industry and Trade Development Strategy (2016–20) shows an
increased awareness of the risks posed by the marginalized participants of the informal sector and the unemployed. The vision is to
achieve integration of local producers with global supply chains in
order to create productive jobs. MSME development and formalis27
Civil non-military production expands steel, cement, chemicals, luxury jeeps,
butane gas cylinders, kitchen stoves, home appliances, gas pipelines, infant incubators, mineral water, pasta, olive oil and other foodstuffs. The Military owns a large
number of gas stations, hotels, wedding halls, supermarkets, parking lots, domestic
cleaning offices, transportation and shipping companies across the country (Ministry
of Military Production, 2018).
28
These companies and their subsidiaries are now operated by the government, it
pays the salaries and collects the revenues (interview #6 2018, Youm7, 2018;
Amnesty International, 2019).
29
In an escalating crackdown on opposition and civil society in the country, the
Egyptian authorities have on June 25th 2019 arbitrarily arrested at least eight
individuals including a former member of parliament, opposition party leaders,
journalists and activists including the owner of the businesses they have earlier
confiscated. The latter is an economist and intellectual (Alyoum, 2019).
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ing the informal sector represents a major pillar in the strategy.
Informal activities will be explicitly handled through a package
of legislative and procedural incentives. The Central Bank obliges
banks to give 20% of their loan portfolio to SMEs, targeting
350,000 SMEs with EGP200 billion at a 5% nominal interest rate
within the coming 4 years (Mondaq, 2019). However, despite
statements to the contrary in the IP document, transparency in
the allocation process and evaluation of its effectiveness are absent
(interview #7). With 36% youth unemployment in 2017 and estimates of over 70% informal sector participants, these measures
are insufficient to reduce the continuing dissent of the marginalized, exacerbated since 2016 by the liberalization of the pound
fuelling inflation reaching over 30 per cent for the last two years.
The army’s development vision is based on mega construction
projects such as the expansion of the Suez Canal and its economic
zone, and mega high-end housing projects. Some of these projects
are run without competitive tendering via direct orders, others are
subject to pseudo competition (interview # 6). The plan is to
expand key industries such as cement and steel for Sisi’s ambitious
construction programme. This plan has two major harmful effects.
First, the military’s rising share has a detrimental crowding out
effect, which is clearly seen in the cement sector. The expansion
of the army’s El-Arish Cement Co. to a capacity to double the value
of current consumption requirements (Reuters, 2018), forced the
state owned company National Cement to stop production in
November 2017. Suez Cement and Alexandria Cement, two private
sector companies reported significant losses (ibid), as did Italcementi a multinational company that consequently stopped production in June 2019 (Jazeera, 2019). Apart from the numerous
advantages, the army’s cost advantage in energy intensive sectors
is supported by a substantial energy subsidy.30 Second, the majority
of new informal employment is in construction (Assaad et al., 2018)
whose expansion partially represents the army’s plan for curbing
unemployment and poverty in an attempt to include the marginalized groups. But growth based on construction creates precarious
employment, it is not productive employment based on structural
transformation based economic growth.
The strong engagement of the army in the economy makes it an
interested party rather than an impartial arbiter between competing stakeholders. Hence, the army cannot establish the legitimacy
required to function with autonomy. In Egypt the state maintains
its dominant position by fiat and repression; there is no space for
a peaceful renegotiation of the contract. Labour is repressed and
the access of business to government depends on its political leanings. These attempts to hold power limit the extent to which the
social contract can be positively transformed.
Morocco’s crony empire continues to be dominated by the King
and his entourage. That is, the developmental model is a result of
path dependence with strong links to the past. The King’s economic
interests still capture monopoly rents. Yet with the increased discontent of the public, the King is operating with some elements
of embedded autonomy especially in his promotion of Moroccan
foreign investment. Through the new financial intermediation
strategy - driven by the monarchy and the mekhzen - the King
focuses on capturing overseas markets in sub-Saharan Africa
(SSA) through raising international funds from the Gulf, Russia
and China. The expansion in SSA is led by the royal holding Al
Mada (SNI/ONA)31 conglomerate and other public and private investors closely linked to the monarchy. These are in particular Attijariwafa Bank, the leading bank in Morocco and the financial arm of Al
Mada and Bank of Africa (BMCE). 32The King has close ties with
30

Following the agreement with the IMF it declined to only 80% of its original level.
A merged body as of 2010 of Société Nationale d’Investissement (SNI) and
Ominum Nord Africain ONA (Hahn & Vidican-Auktor, 2018).
32
with subsidiaries in over 15 African counties
31
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BMCE’s president Othmane Benjelloune, a member of the royal foundation Mohamed VI (Michbal, 2014; Oubenal & Ben Hamouda,
2018). Seeking opportunities elsewhere in Africa offers the elite
the chance of economic profits without direct predation on local
markets, the latter now generating a credible political threat to the
regime. The regime now channels public funds not only to his own
companies but also to other Moroccan and international firms
(Times, 2019). In addition to holdings in a number of sectors such
as finance and construction, the King’s holding Al Mada holds shares
in retail where it owns shareholdings in the two automotive companies Sopriam (distributor of Peugeot, Citroen, and DP) and Renault
Maroc (Iraqi, 2016).
Moroccan business associations and private sector groups have
actively initiated, designed and implemented key components of
parts of the industrial strategy PNEI 2005–2014 (Cammett, 2006;
Hahn & Vidican-Auktor, 2018).33 The subsequent plan, the Plan
for Industrial Acceleration 2014–2020 (Plan d’Accélération Industrielle, PAI) continues to refine the institutionalized integration of
private actors in the implementation of policy measures. They draw
for example on the close collaboration of the Moroccan Association
of Textile and Garments (AMITH) and of the Moroccan Association
for Automotive Trade and Industry (AMICA), which reflects the rapid
growth of the automotive and aeronautics industries (Fig. A3; Hahn
and Vidican-Auktor, 2017, 2018).34 In addition to serving his own
economic interests, the King is playing a facilitative role for the
entire sector in which he has interests.
As a result, the lines between self-interest and benevolence are
hard to draw. The system is not one of equal consultation of different stakeholders but one which depends on the inherent embedded authority through the King’s position as monarch. The royal
entourage’s and the King’s personal substantial stake in companies
across the economy provide incentives for him to favour his economic interests. Hence, his claim to ‘embedded autonomy’ comes
not from the impartial nature of his mediating role, but that he
has that role as monarch. Nevertheless, being ‘autonomous’ allows
him the space to promote reform. The King’s intermediation strategy and the remarkable growth of the automotive and aeronautics
industries despite his stake is strongly backed by his direct
involvement (Hahn and Vidican-Auktor, 2017, 2018).35
To redress the negligible deliverables to the marginalized
groups of the contract specific support programs, such as Imtiaz,
Mousanada and Moukawaliti that directly target MSMEs upgrading
have gained momentum and widened their scope as part of the
PNEI. The level of support however remains small. Comprehending
the power of the grievance of the unemployed, the King set up the
Moroccan Economic and Social Council to help integrate Moroccan
youth into the labour force and propose the necessary training
skills that would enhance their opportunities to secure jobs
(World Bank, 2011). Moreover, after the protests the government
devised a social package to provide jobs directly and increase

33
The Ministry of Industry and its arms Maroc PME, Invest in Morocco and Maroc
Export as well as 8 other ministries on the one hand and the General Confederation of
Moroccan Enterprises (CGEM) and the Professional Association of Moroccan Banks in
the formulating Morocco’s Plan Emergence (its industrial policy) 2005–2014.
34
Though the rapidly growing exports of automotives are mostly low on value
added (VA). Value added retained at home whilst slightly improving since 2011 is still
moderate at just US$366 million $ in 2016 less than Egypt’s (US$531 million $) for the
same year. Figs. A3a, A5t give a direct comparison of sectoral VA per country. With
respect to aeronautics, the sector’s VA although growing is retaining only a third of
what Tunisia is retaining at home (Figs. A3b, A5u). Egypt’s small sector is relatively
generating a lot of VA, thanks to its strict local content requirements (El-Haddad,
Hodge, & Manek, 2017). Compared to Tunisia, despite the large export volume it is
retaining way less VA in textiles and clothing (Figs. A4a-b, A5c-d).
35
He formed a ministers-businessmen steering committee that meets monthly to
remove obstacles and speed up investment procedures. This intervention whilst
potentially serving positive outcomes remains discretionary.
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wages for public civil and military personnel36 in a clear attempt to
reinstate them as one of the key privileged social groups in the
emerging contract.
The regime was hostile to the development of a vigorous and
independent labour movement (Entelis, 1996) so it exploited the
divide between the rural and the more politically demanding
urban populations. These divisions deepen the apparent gap in
demands of the various groups, hindering their emergence as a
unified political movement (cf. Bergh & Rossi-Doria, 2015).
Nonetheless, F20M united these forces. In recognition of the people’s power and within the resulting increased opening of the political sphere the three Moroccan trade unions UMT-CDT and FDT
signed a strategic agreement on united trade union action in January 2014 suggesting that government maybe more open to an
active union movement. The strategic agreement may pave the
way for a single union body which would be the voice of the formal
public sector. Participants of the informal sector however, remain
with no formal union organization. Whether the moderate
attempts to include the informal sector through PNEI’s increased
focus on MSME development and the reassertion of public employment are sufficient to manage dissent depends on their success.
Containing dissent will also depend on the King’s ability to include
large parts of the economy in his intermediation strategy as well as
on the progress of the advanced regionalization process to reduce
regional disparities through a decentralization process empowering the newly elected local governments (cf. Collado & Ojeda,
2015). This process also reflects awareness of the benefits of
agglomeration.37 Nonetheless discontent over centralized decision
making and a political system dominated by the monarchy remains
(Houdret & Harnisch, 2018). Many of the constitutional reforms
require further legal frameworks that are not yet in place (ibid.)
which drives critics to claim that no real change has taken place.
But despite the increased repression lately a culture of protest is
slowly emerging throughout the country (Rachidi, 2019) - unlike
the Egyptian case in which such signs of opposition are repressed.
The path dependence inherent in the central role of the Monarchy also means that the ‘unsocial’ social contract will not be
removed overnight. Thus far it appears as though Morocco is heading towards a less ‘unsocial’ social contract with greater deliverables to the marginalized, but with no guarantee they will be
sustained except the fear on the part of the regime of renewed
unrest and the persistence of peaceful protests that maintain pressure on the regime’s promised political and economic reforms.
Tunisia’s former crony’s assets have been confiscated. The current political environment has not produced the final restructuring
of that group yet. New policies are not yet clearly developed or
implemented, though a serious social dialogue process is emerging
that will eventually shape the relationship between the state and
the various social groups. A better social contract may thus be
evolving due to this process.
Immediately following the revolution, two IP measures have
been instituted in response to the grievances of the disadvantaged
social groups. As in Egypt and Morocco public sector hiring rose
sharply in the wake of the revolution. The newly elected government expanded payrolls to reward supporters both as a form of
social protection and to reinstate staff dismissed by the Ben Ali
regime (World Bank, 2016). Second, the country’s IP was reduced
to an employment program launched by the interim government
in 2012 with the name AMAL (‘Hope’ in Arabic) originally designed
to provide unemployed university degree-holders with employ-

36

Leading to the re-rise of the earlier reduced public wage bill (World Bank, 2011).
Including efficiency gains in terms of increased productivity, improvement in
consumption inequalities between regions and reduction in poverty rates in remote
areas.
37

ment for up to 12 months. It offered beneficiaries training, career
coaching and a monthly stipend of TND 200 (US$276 equal to
about 80 percent of the minimum wage). In practice however,
AMAL primarily provided cash assistance to unemployed graduates
(Robalino, Margolis, Rother, Newhouse, & Lundberg, 2013). In an
attempt to avoid costly subsidies with limited impact on employability the program was discontinued in 2013. Like most government programmes no evidence is available to measure the
impact of that program (Abaab, 2012 in World Bank, 2015).
To consolidate social protection and labour policy AMAL was
replaced in 2013 by new wage subsidy and training programmes.
It also included incentives for self-employment and so targeted
the informal sector. Reforms undertaken in 2013 consolidated
job insertion programs financed by the National Employment Fund
from five programs into three: two supporting training and wage
subsidies, and a first-time employment program (PEE). However,
as of 2015, implementation remains slow (Schaefer, 2017).
But Tunisia’s social contract on the other hand is likely to witness improvements that may well lead to stability in the coming
years. The country does not have the ‘inherent forced stability’ provided by the Army in Egypt and the monarchy in Morocco. The lack
of these institutional breaks has allowed Tunisia to launch on a
more ambitious path of social dialogue in order to negotiate the
terms of the incipient social contract.
Ben Ali’s fast exit to Saudi Arabia allowed for a reframing of
state-society relations (Deane, 2013).38 In contrast to both Egypt
and Morocco, the new constitution considers the will of the people
as source of legislation instead of Islam, the king or the army (The
Tunisian Constitution 2014). The constitution also created a Constitutional Court which restricts the legislative power and prevents
laws that would go against rights and freedoms from being ratified.
The country enjoys competitive elections which are constitutionally
guaranteed by article 35 (EFDS, 2018).
Following the enactment of a number of regulations that reinforce freedom of association, access to foreign funds, human rights
protections and clear rights and obligations to these organizations
(e.g. # 88/2011, #5183/2013, the constitution of 2014) civil society
(CS) in Tunisia gained autonomy and ability to effect changes.
These laws are in stark contrast to Egypt’s restrictive CS organization (CSO) law #70/201739 which resulted in the closure of hundreds of CSOs. Tunisia’s political transformation is attributed to CS
empowerment (Deane, 2013). Tunisia is thus rated ‘free’ by freedom
house whereas Egypt is rated as ‘not free’ and Morocco partly free
(House, 2018).
In response to Tunisia’s new relaxed regulations, there has been
massive expansion in CSO creating active social and political
spaces. Following a 10-months National Dialogue, in January
2013 the government, the secretary general of UGTT, and the President of the employers’ association, UTICA, the Tunisian Human
Rights League (LADH) and the Tunisian Order of Lawyers have
signed a joint Social Pact to unlock new ways in developing industrial relations. In the past, business associations were only vehicles
for conveying state policy to the private sector. Ben Ali’s clan dominated UTICA through its president Hedi Djilani being a close ally of
Ben Ali since 1988. He was forced to step down after the upheavals.
The Pact rests on the value of social dialogue as a genuine pillar of
an economic development model geared towards targeted employment and greater social justice (Jemail, 2015).
The agreement will focus on five main areas: growth and regional development, employment and vocational training, industrial
relations and decent work, social welfare, and on institutionaliza38
Old practices will not change overnight; there remains evidence of the continuation of old practices of corruption, collusion and customs fraud (Rijkers et al.
2017a).
39
The law was not discussed in any forum or in parliament before enactment.
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tion of a tripartite dialogue.40 This contrasts to Morocco’s steering
committees which entirely exclude labour unions. The publicprivate dialogue (PPD) is at the heart of any policy plans for the
country. The National Council of Social Dialogue provides the institutional structure for promoting and nurturing this social dialogue culture to foster social peace and contain conflict, thereby building the
foundations of the new social contract.
Despite the strides on the social dialogue front, some societal
groups remain largely excluded. UGTT mainly presents public sector administration and blue collar public workers but the noncrony market participants, especially high skilled professionals
who are squeezed by inflation and stagnant wages are largely
excluded from that dialogue.41 Same is true of informal sector participants, who are also on the rise since the uprisings. But with the
end of the transition process and establishment and institutionalization of the societal dialogue the prospects for further inclusion are
promising.
Tunisia established a new legislative framework that partially
removes the ambiguity in the laws that created opportunities for
rent and corruption. The new laws for investment (#71/2016), fiscal incentives (#8/2017) and financial incentives (#389/2017) set
clear rules to market access in terms of the administrative requirements and procedures. The laws introduced equality between
Tunisian and foreign investors, opened up international transfer
of funds and set clear investor guarantees and obligations. Success
of this reform however hinges upon reforms of the financial and
banking sectors. The large state-owned banks that dominate the
banking sector lack expertise in risk selection. The sector was
weakened by the private interests of the clans of the previous
regime who received credit based on a different set of criteria, burdening the sector with a high level of non-performing loans (OECD,
2015).
There have been conscious efforts to work on the duality problem. Segregation of the offshore/onshore sectors due to excessive
barriers to entry to the extent that it was easier to export to France
than it was to the onshore sector (World Bank, 2014). The government has now, for example, raised corporate tax rates on exporting
firms from 0 to 10% and reduced it from 35 to 25% for nonexporting firms42 (Oxford Business Group, 2016).
Tunisia is allowing close cooperation with international multilaterals. For example, the value chain development platform is part
of a World Bank-supported pilot project with the goal of institutionalizing an integrated, analytical, participatory and market oriented approach to value chain development in order to guard
against risks of capture. What is remarkable is that this initiative
is supported by a number of relevant ministries43 and is not just left
to the ministry of industry in cooperation with small and medium
enterprise support agencies (APIA, APII, and CEPEX) and a couple
of regional development ones (ODNO and ODCO). Pharmaceuticals
were among the pilot sectors and the results include: 1) reduction
of delays in medical appraisal reviews, to put products on the market
from 2.5 to 3 years in 2013 to just 6–9 months in 2017; 2) a decree in
2014 modernizing the regulatory framework of clinical trials; and 3)
achieving consensus between ministries of trade, health and social
affairs on medical pricing processes. These agreements are reached
in a transparent, efficient and participatory manner. Similar strides

40

Tripartism refers to the involvement of employers’ and workers’ organizations,
alongside the government, on an equal footing, in decision-making (ILO, 2013). Civil
dialogue however is another form of dialogue that involves representatives of
workers’ and employers’ organizations along with a selection of civic and social
interest groups (i.e. not with the government, Friedman, 2010).
41
Many of them are looking for opportunities outside the country.
42
Albeit not necessarily the best economic policy in this regards.
43
Development, investment; three technical ones: trade and industry, agriculture,
employment and vocational training.
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based on broad-based PPDs are taking place in IT and electronics
(Nefati, 2017). Large increases in both electronics exports and value
added (VA) have recently taken place in the country, the latter much
higher than in either Morocco or Egypt (Fig. A5 gives a direct comparison of sectoral VA per country).
Despite these diligent efforts along the road to peaceful negotiation of the social contract, the unstable political environment,
excessive number of labour strikes, militant threat and the
attempts to change the ownership structure of the substantial
amount of confiscated assets represent a drag on the economy.
The nationalist party Nida Tunis contains the remaining cronies
from Ben Ali’s time. After the crack down on Muslim Brotherhood
in Egypt Annahda, Tunisia’s Islamist party is cautious not wanting
to change the economic power structure (interview #8 2018).
Instead, it attempts to join in, perhaps preserving the old captured
structures. Both parties now receive substantial funds from businesses, a practice that is common to modern democracies. Additionally, the fact that Tunisia’s semi-presidential system
combines elements of parliamentary and presidential systems presents an obstacle. The different powers the 2014 constitution
bestows on the two executives, the country’s president and that
of the government has repeatedly contributed to a political stalemate (Mekki, 2019).
Terrorism is a challenge for CSOs. Violence has continued in
Tunisia since 2015, most stayed on the border but some targeted
tourists. Recently a suicide bombing in central Tunis injured at
least nine people (Guardian, 2018). In addition to the direct detrimental effect of terrorism, it is used to justify repression. Indeed, in
a clear violation to the 88/2011 law the government has recently
suspended hundreds of organisations for alleged links to terrorism.
The recent extension of the state of emergency in Tunisia permits
authorities to implement arbitrary and prohibitive measures to
curtail fundamental freedoms (e.g. suppression of social protests
or undermining freedom of expression) which may have restraining effect on the effectiveness of the social dialogue. Additionally,
the Constitutional Court is still - five years after its creation in
the new constitution - looking for its posts to be filled in order to
commence its role.
The most alarming challenge is the National Constituent Assembly’s refusal to constitutionalise the Social Pact which was seen to
create a social democracy and to institute the right to collective
bargaining. The refusal came in response to the influx of labour
strikes. As employers lost their former grip over workers, there
has been a sharp rise in the number of strikes detrimental to the
competiveness of the economy (Baccouche, 2016). These challenges despite expected in a fledgling democracy have indeed significantly staggered the current economic performance of the
country.44
The Assembly’s refusal discouraged the social players who
signed the pact. As a result, it has to date not been followed by tangible effects (ibid.). To the contrary, UGTT Deputy Secretary General believes that the new retirement law approved in June 2018
contradicts the axis on social protection of the Social Pact
(Numerique, 2018).

44
Fig. A22a shows that the exports of both Egypt and Morocco have picked up in
2015 compared to Tunisia’s which have dropped even further since. Morocco’s hardly
declined – experiencing only a small dip in 2013. In terms of labour productivity
Tunisia is now at the bottom of the list (Fig. A22b–e). Tunisia’s GDP growth has
equally plummeted (Fig. A1). But that is true for Morocco too indicating that Egypt’s
stability and its construction-real estate led development strategy is helping the
country grow but not through structural transformation and productive employment.
External debt is rising exponentially especially for Egypt and Tunisia. But Tunisia’s is
over double that of Egypt as a percent of GDP (85% compared to 35% For Egypt in
2017, Morocco’s is 45%). This could also risk the positive trends of Tunisia’s transition.
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So there are several challenges that may stall or even reverse
the direction towards a new more inclusive social contract. The
risk remains. But Tunisia is still in the process of building the foundations of a social dialogue to reform the social contract. Thus far,
this process is clearly very far advanced compared to Egypt, and
also more advanced than Morocco.

5. Conclusion
Industrial policies and regulations have been important factors
in defining the shifting social contracts in Egypt, Morocco and
Tunisia. The changing social contracts have reflected the balance
of power of the various social groups thus defining the social contract’s substantive dimension and determining its stability and
durability. This analysis has implications for those seeking to support democratic development in the region. International efforts to
support democratic development in these countries need to be
conditioned on the differing nature of the ongoing transitions in
the social contract.
Central to the social contract in these three countries over the
last decade has been the state’s relationship with the powerful
group of businesspeople benefitting from crony capitalism. This
analysis of state-business relations links to the recent literature
on political settlements. A further extension would be to explore
the implications of the empirical findings in this paper in the light
of that literature. This literature offers insights as to how differing
configurations of power shape the incentives for elites to pursue
growth and structural transformation oriented activities.45 Healthy
state-business relations can induce structural transformation and
growth. This growth may eventually provide the fiscal basis for a
more efficient rules-based, impersonal systems which gradually displace the clientelist settlements in which the business elites continue to need to be kept satisfied with various types of rents.
Examples of such development are the successes of Rwanda, Ethiopia, China and Vietnam (Kelsall, 2014) which have managed to
achieve structural transformation through tight knit relations
between the state and the businesses, some of which display
favouritism.
It is both the longevity and the concentration46 of the ruling
coalitions or of the political settlement which are preconditions for
growth (Kelsall & vom Hau, 2017; Khan, 2005, 2010) and ordered
deals (Pritchett, Sen, & Werker, 2018). The latter are honoured
government-business deals which can also lead to growth. Longevity
can breed mutual developmental interests of politicians and business elites, pockets of effective public services47 and learning for
productivity all of which can stimulate structural transformation48
based economic growth49 (Whitfield, Therkildsen, Buur, & Kjær,
2015).50 This is so because ruling elites in unipolar or dominant settings do not need to waste a lot of resources to buy the support of a
wider base of the lower level factions (Khan, 2010). They also have
longer horizons, making them more likely to invest in developmental industrial policies that offer longer-term payoffs, whereas in

competitive or multipolar settings however there are weaker incentives for either side to commit (Tyce, 2018).
Despite the longevity of the settlement and its dominant nature
in all three countries, and despite some levels of structural transformation and growth, the policies did not induce a move to
Pritchett et al. (2018) second transition to more inclusive openordered deals; that is, competitive deals equally accessible to all
players which eventually induce market contestability and structural transformation. Neither did it induce a move to a Potential
Developmental Coalition type of settlement (Khan, 2010) as in
Japan or the Asian Tigers. Instead, the resulting state-business relations of the 1980s through to the uprisings predominately bred
crony capitalism, or in Booth (2015) terminology it bred agreements to carve up the spoils. Hence, the social contract grew
weaker as the state’s deliverables to the business elites or the cronies increasingly took away from the economic and social rights of
the other economic units or social groups as we refer to them here.
The failure of the three countries to achieve sufficient structural
transformation by breaking the shackles of selective protectionism
stems from the ruling elites’ inability to understand that rapid
development is necessary to ensure peace, legitimacy and durability of the existing contract. Up to the uprisings, there were no
incentives for that either.
With the changing incentives post Arab Spring, the regimes in
Morocco and Tunisia appear to have somewhat learned this lesson.
In contrast, the regime in Egypt maintains its legitimacy by fiat and
repression limiting any prospects of a favourable contract
transition.
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For a comprehensive review of the literature, see Tyce (2018).
Here they mean dominant/unipolar political contexts in contrast to competitive/multipolar. One may think of the former regimes as closer to authoritarian
regimes.
47
E.g. in export processing zones.
48
So not just any type of growth rather, growth that comes from structural
transformation.
49
To eradicate poverty and raise incomes
50
The automotive and aeronautic industries in Morocco present clear cases of
Whitfield et al. (2015) building mutual interests, creating pockets of effectiveness and
learning for productivity concepts.
46
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Fig. A1. GDP per capita annual growth rate. Source: WDI (2018b).

Fig. A21. Economic Performance under the ‘Unsocial’ Social Contract (2004–2010). Source: Author’s Calculations. Data: 2a), 2c) WDI (2018a); 2b) UNIDO (2018).
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Fig. A22. Changing Economic Performance under the Emerging Contracts (2011–2017). Source: Author’s Calculations. Data: 2a) WITS (2018) 2b-e) UNIDO (2018);
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Fig. A3. Exports and Value Added of Motor vehicles and Aeronautics Industry. Source: Value Added: UNIDO (2018); exports: WITS (2018). Notes: ISIC Revision 3 is used.

Fig. A4. Exports and Value Added of Textiles and Garments. Source: Value Added: UNIDO (2018); exports: WITS (2018). Notes: ISIC Revision 3 is used. Source: Value Added:
UNIDO (2018); exports: WITS (2018) Notes: ISIC Revision 3.
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Fig. A5. Sectoral Value Added by Country. Source: UNIDO (2018).
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Fig. A5 (continued)
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Fig. A5 (continued)
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Fig. A5 (continued)
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